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1. Introduction1 
Structural crises have been the subject of research for many scholars deriving from 
diverse theoretical backgrounds for a long time. In the Marxist tradition of economic 
thought, structural crises lie in the center of an ongoing debate, as one of the fundamental 
issues of Marx’s theory. As a theory that attempts to deal with the entire network of 
socioeconomic relations that develop under the capitalist system of production, Marxian 
political economy has engaged in a long-lasting debate on the role and the causes of 
structural crises in the process of capital accumulation. Since profit is the primal goal of 
any investment in capitalism and the motive power behind capital accumulation, 
profitability is one of the key concepts when discussing structural crises.  
One great structural crisis is also the Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the global 
economic crisis that followed the outbreak of the 2007-2008 financial slump in the US. 
This crisis has once more provoked a wide academic and public discussion on both its 
proximate and ultimate causes. There have only been three other structural crises in the 
roughly two-and-a-half centuries of capitalist development that can be compared in their 
extent and severity to the Great Recession; the Long Depression of the 1880s, the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. The Great Recession is 
the biggest in length and output-decline crisis since the Great Depression (NBER, 2013).  
From the peak in December 2007 to the trough in June 2009 unemployment rates doubled 
(from 5.0 % to 10.0%) and long-term unemployment is consistently higher than in any 
other recession period (BLS, 2012).
2
 Industrial output, personal income, trade volumes, 
and stock markets plummeted worldwide. The US economy contracted by roughly 4% 
during that period as did most high income economies of the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the recovery since then has been sluggish 
and weak compared to post-crisis growth rates of the past (World Bank, 2013). This 
development can be understood in the globalized market environment that exists 
nowadays, where economic relations are much stronger than in the past and economies of 
different countries are much more interdependent. It is also evident by the transfusion of 
the crisis from the US  to the Eurozone in the form of a sovereign debt crisis. 
Only few researchers have addressed the question as to why there has been such a 
drastic structural shift in the US from industrial to financial and banking activities and if 
that is the reason behind the intensification of the crisis and the growing instability of the 
economy. The US economy has become highly dependent on credit expansion and 
imports, and household as well as government debt have risen significantly. Domestic 
investment in manufacturing, as well as manufacturing as a productive sector, have 
                                                 
1
 This part draws heavily and builds upon previous work of mine (drafts and paper assignments) submitted 
in 2012 and 2013 for other courses. 
2
 Graphs with descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A. 
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declined greatly over the last thirty years. Since the driving force of the US economy is 
consumption and manufactured goods account for the vast majority of consumer 
purchases, the trade deficit is increasing throughout this period. The sustainability of this 
development paradigm on a macro level is threatened by the specific economic 
conjuncture described above.  
 
For many years, the importance of concepts such as capital accumulation and the profit 
rate in the study of long-term economic performance has been devalued by the 
marginalist mainstream that favored the inquiry of psychological, behavioral, monetary, 
or other micro-factors. The failure of these approaches in predicting and explaining the 
current crisis reveals the necessity for the revival of macro-oriented approaches with 
regard to economic growth under capitalism. Considering these facts, it is interesting to 
examine whether the present crisis has its roots solely in the financial sphere of the 
economy, or if it is indirectly connected with the long-term economic performance and 
profitability of the “real” economy.  
Most studies about the Great Recession concentrate on the period following the 
dot-com bubble in 2000, mainly stressing the financial and monetary aspects of it. In the 
majority of these publications, the crisis is considered an outcome of various exogenous 
factors and bad policy, thus neglecting endogenous factors that give an explanation on 
why structural crises constitute a recurrent event in the process of capitalist development. 
Many analysts argue that this crisis is a result of very low interest rates, vast credit 
expansion, and extensive debt levels (both public and private) in the period preceding the 
crisis (Austrian school of economic thought). There are nevertheless explanations of the 
Great Recession that focus on the proximate causes of its financial dimension and adopt 
an endogenous or at least institutional approach with regard to the recurrence of 
economic crises. A brief overview of these theories will be presented in section 3. 
Nevertheless, our main goal here will be to examine the underlying and not the proximate 
causes of the crisis. 
1.1. Aim, hypothesis, and outline of the thesis 
The aim of this research project is to examine if the present crisis has its roots in the long-
term profitability performance of the corporate business (CB) and nonfinancial corporate 
business (NFCB) sectors of the US economy. A declining average rate of profit could 
indicate that a deep structural crisis in the “real” economy of the US led to capital seeking 
investments in short-term and/or speculative financial activities, thus causing an over-
saturation of interest-bearing capital in the markets and a bubble. In this sense, the goal of 
this study is to investigate the fundamental factors of this crisis and not the financial, 
monetary, or policy factors that played the biggest role in maximizing its effects. The 
credit bubble, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the consequent financial crisis are 
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considered the epiphenomenon of the crisis and not its cause, which may potentially have 
postponed the effects of a long-standing structural crisis. 
Thus, the hypothesis to be examined is that the Great Recession was caused by an 
excess of profit-seeking capitals in the financial sector, which is an outcome of 
problematic profitability in the sphere of production. The theoretical foundations of this 
hypothesis will be presented in the next section. The simple questions we will try to 
address are the following: (1) Did the profit rate in the CB and NFCB sectors fall during 
this period? (2) If so, how much did it fall, did it recover at all, and to what extent in the 
neoliberal era? (3) Why did it fall/recover/not recover? 
In this context, our goal is to calculate several profit rates for the CB and the 
NFCB sectors, in order to examine their levels, trends, and fluctuations in a long-term 
perspective and identify if the instability of the US economy is connected with declining 
returns to capital in the goods-producing sector during the entire postwar period. 
Therefore, the research question of this thesis can be summarized as follows: Do the 
different profit rate measures for the CB and NFCB sectors indicate a long-term 
profitability crisis in the “real” economy, which has led capital seeking alternative outlets 
of profit in the financial sector of the US economy in the period leading up to the crisis? 
The thesis that will be proposed here is that profit rates recovered only partially in 
the period between 1980 and 1997 and cannot reach their pre-1970s levels, indicating a 
long-term fragility of the accumulation process in the US economy. It is argued that this 
process encouraged a glut of unproductive investments in financial and residential assets 
that favored the creation of bubbles. In our view, the long-lasting incapacity of the US 
economy to achieve a stable recovery lies in the protectionism of policy makers who have 
not allowed the vast destruction of unproductive capital in the fear of extreme aftershocks 
that would endanger the established socioeconomic and political order, as in the case of 
the Great Depression. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured according to the following plan: 
 
In the second section, the theoretical framework of the formulated hypothesis is 
presented, which covers Marx’s crisis theory in regard to the “Law of the Tendency of 
the Rate of Profit to Fall”, a discussion of historical interpretations of crisis in that 
tradition, and the criticism to those approaches. The third section comprises of the 
methodological approach that is followed in the calculation of the data series with a small 
note on known qualitative and quantitative issues. The fourth section includes an outline 
of previous research concerning the 1970s crisis and the state of the ongoing debate on 
profitability and the Great Recession, as well as a brief presentation of the 
financialization approaches. The fifth section examines the calculated profitability trends 
and presents the results, and finally the last section offers the conclusion that is drawn 
from this inquiry. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The “Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall” 
Marx was not the only, nor the first one, to investigate declining returns to capital. The 
founders of Political Economy, the classical economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and 
John Stuart Mill had also written about the topic and given their explanations on why 
profitability would tend to decline in the process of capitalist development, a view which 
they strongly supported (Milios, Dimoulis, & Economakis, 2002, p. 145). Neither the 
presentation of their arguments nor the well-established criticism to them lies within the 
scope and limitations of the present study. It will be attempted to answer the research 
question from a heterodox point of view, drawing the theoretical background mainly 
from the Marxian literature on crises and more specifically from Marx’s “Law of the 
Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall” (LTRPF). The profit rate is a key variable in 
Marxian economics that is a crucial determinant of capital accumulation and investment 
policies, which in turn, largely define the successful reproduction and growth of the 
economy.
3
 The profit rate can generally be described as the ratio of profit flows for a 
certain period to the advanced capital, fixed and circulating, that was used during that 
specific period in the creation and realization of this profit. The Marxian equation for the 
profit rate (p) is the following: 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 ⁄
 
 ⁄   
 ,                                    (1) 
where the total amount of profit produced in a period, the surplus value (s), is divided by 
the total amount of capital invested in that period (C), which is the sum of constant 
capital (c) (i.e. plants, machinery, raw materials etc.) and variable capital (v) (employee 
compensation). If we further divide the first equation by v, we derive at the final form of 
equation (1). The s/v fraction is the rate of surplus value (or rate of exploitation) and the 
c/v fraction is the organic composition of capital (OCC) in value terms.  
According to Marx (1991, Part III, Chapter 13), during the process of capitalist 
development and increasing competition, there is an endogenous drive for the individual 
capitalist to introduce new technology in order to raise the labor productivity and thus the 
rate of surplus value. Since technological innovation implies the use of more machinery 
compared to living labor (means of production per laborer in material terms, i.e. the 
technical composition of capital in Marxian terms or else capital intensity), then ceteris 
paribus, a rise in the OCC, which is the denominator in equation (1) would cause a 
                                                 
3
 “It is the rate of profit that is the driving force in capitalist production, and nothing is produced save 
what can be produced at a profit. Hence the concern of the English economists over the decline in the 
profit rate” (Marx, 1991, p. 368). 
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decline in the rate of profit. The same would happen in any case of an increase in the 
OCC (c/v) which is greater than the rise in the rate of surplus value (s/v). 
Although, Marx valued this law highly and wrote extensively on it, he 
acknowledged that the LTRPF is only valid under specific assumptions (ceteris paribus) 
and there are “counteracting  forces” which come into play and give it a merely 
tendential rather than an absolute character (Marx, 1991, Part III, Chapter 14). In this 
context, the declining underlying trend of the rate of profit will only under specific 
historical conditions, when the system is fragile, produce more generalized crises 
(Shaikh, 1978a). In other words, the rate of profit will not exhibit a long-standing secular 
decline. This means that Marx only examines this law using the scientific method of 
abstraction in order to discover the endogenous dynamic forces that would affect the 
profit rate if all other independent variables remained constant (Milios et al., 2002, pp. 
194-196). In that sense, all exogenous factors that affect the trajectory of an economy in a 
specific historical, socioeconomic, political, and institutional environment are being 
neglected in favour of the inherent attributes of capitalist development. 
2.2. Marxian theory of crises 
Economic crises vary significantly in extent, intensity, general attributes, consequences, 
and forms of manifestation. The outcome of all these factors depends in every occasion 
on the specific historical conditions (economic, social, political etc.) and on the given 
socioeconomic power relations. In that context the present crisis also displays special 
characteristics that need to be studied in order to compare and contrast them with 
previous crises and possibly draw conclusions on the underlying causes of structural 
crises and the mechanisms that lead to their recurrence in the capitalist mode of 
production. One of Marx’s main contributions to the investigation of economic crises is 
that in his theoretical system, crises are closely related with the process of economic 
growth and are an endogenous outcome of the contradictory forces that develop during 
that process. Mainstream schools of economic thought only consider crises to be caused 
by exogenous factors, but this approach does not provide any theoretical insights on the 
recurrence of structural crises. In the following passage from the third Volume of Capital 
Marx outlines the innate nature of periodical crises in capitalism: 
“The periodical devaluation of the existing capital, which is a means, 
immanent to the capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall in the 
profit rate and accelerating the accumulation of capital value by the 
formation of new capital, disturbs the given conditions in which the 
circulation and reproduction process of capital takes place, and is therefore 
accompanied by sudden stoppages and crises in the production process. […] 
Capitalist production constantly strives to overcome these immanent barriers, 
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but it overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers afresh and on a 
more powerful scale” (Marx, 1991, p. 358). 
In Marxian analysis all crises are considered as internally and externally generated 
temporary shocks and disturbances in the process of capital accumulation and 
reproduction that stem from the inherently antagonistic and conflicting nature of 
capitalist development (Shaikh, 1978a). Although crises are considered as potential 
moments of destabilization of the economy, they also work as a way to restore stability in 
the economy through the destruction of unproductive capital, something that gives them a 
periodical and temporary character: 
“[A]t certain points the conflict of contending agencies breaks through in 
crises. Crises are never more than momentary, violent solutions for the 
existing contradictions, violent eruptions that re-establish the disturbed 
balance for the time being” (Marx, 1991, p. 357). 
This can to some extent explain the fact that Marx did not develop a solid “unitary” crisis 
theory as a distinct and self-standing theoretical concept as his main task was to examine 
the determinative forces in the capitalist economy (Tabb, 2010). Instead his references to 
crises are spread throughout his earlier works and are more of descriptive and empirical 
character (Milios et al., 2002, p. 158). The following segments describe the situation prior 
and during a crisis and could very well be used to describe the situation of the US 
economy on the verge of the Great Recession: 
“The chain of payment obligations at specific dates is broken in a hundred 
places, and this is still further intensified by an accompanying breakdown of 
the credit system, which had developed alongside capital. All this therefore 
leads to violent and acute crises, sudden forcible devaluations, an actual 
stagnation and disruption in the reproduction process, and hence to an actual 
decline in reproduction […] On the eve of the crisis, and during it, the 
commodity capital is contracted in its capacity as potential money capital. It 
represents less money capital for its owner and his creditors (also as security 
for bills of exchange and loans) than at the time it was bought and when the 
discounts and loans made with it as security were concluded” (Marx, 1991, 
pp. 363, 622). 
However in his more mature economic works, and especially in the 3
rd
 Volume of 
Capital and in his Theories of Surplus Value,
4
 which were both published after his death, 
                                                 
4
 The third Volume of Capital was written by Marx between 1863 and 1883, edited, and completed by 
Friedrich Engels, before its first publication in 1894, eleven years after Marx's death. Theories of Surplus 
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he tries to develop his ideas on crises in a more structured theoretical way although his 
work remains ambivalent on this subject. That has caused a large debate within the 
Marxist scholars with regard to what is the Marxian theory of crises, or which of the 
dominant interpretations of Marx’s writings is the most insightful on this specific topic. 
This historical debate on the origin of economic crises, which began at the dawn of the 
20
th
 century, continues unresolved up to this day and the Great Recession has sparked yet 
another series of intellectual conflict among exponents of different versions of Marx’s 
theory. As Natalie Moszkowska aptly put it in 1935 and still holds true: “In no field of 
Political Economy is there to be found such a great gap between the different viewpoints 
as in the investigation of economic crises” (1935, p. 37).  
In some passages, Marx advocates the underconsumption of the working forces as 
the cause of crises,
5
 whereas in most other parts of his work he strongly refutes that view, 
by considering underconsumption only as an aftereffect of the crisis.
6
 His main argument 
is that the fall in the rate of profit is accompanied by an overproduction of capital 
(overaccumulation), as an outcome of higher concentration of capital which intends to 
counterbalance for the tendency of the rate of profit to fall through a higher mass of 
profits (Marx, 1991, Part III, Chapter 15).
7
 So in this case arises the situation that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Value is considered as the fourth Volume of Capital. It was written between 1862 and 1863 and a first 
version of the manuscript was initially published in three volumes between 1905 and 1910 by Karl 
Kautsky. Both books include in these versions rearrangements, modifications, omissions, supplements and 
corrections to the original text that sometimes distort its meaning and are not considered scientifically 
accurate, something that has also affected the historical debate on crises (Heinrich, 1996; Milios et al., 
2002, pp. 206-214, Chapter 10). 
5
 “The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the 
masses, in the face of the drive of capitalist production to develop the productive forces as if only the 
absolute consumption capacity of society set a limit to them” (Marx, 1991, p. 615). 
6
 In a passage from the second Volume of Capital Marx contradicts both the abovementioned 
underconsumptionist approach as well as the Keynesian view that promotes the lack of effective demand: 
“It is a pure tautology to say that crises are provoked by a lack of effective demand or effective 
consumption. The capitalist system does not recognize any forms of consumer other than those who can pay 
[…] If the attempt is made to give this tautology the semblance of greater profundity, by the statement that 
the working class receives too small a portion of its own product, and that the evil would be remedied if it 
received a bigger share, i.e. if its wages rose, we need only note that crises are always prepared by a 
period in which wages generally rise, and the working class actually does receive a greater share in the 
part of the annual product destined for consumption. From the standpoint of these advocates of sound and 
„simple‟ (!) common sense, such periods should rather avert the crisis. It thus appears that capitalist 
production involves certain conditions independent of people's good or bad intentions, which permit the 
relative prosperity of the working class only temporarily, and moreover always as a harbinger of crisis” 
(Marx, 1992, pp. 486-487). 
7
 “A fall in the profit rate, and accelerated accumulation, are simply different expressions of the same 
process, in so far as both express the development of productivity […] a fall in this rate slows down the 
formation of new, independent capitals and thus appears as a threat to the development of the capitalist 
production process; it promotes overproduction, speculation and crises, and leads to the existence of 
excess capital alongside a surplus population […] The barriers to the capitalist mode of production show 
themselves… in the way that the development of labour productivity involves a law, in the form of the 
falling rate of profit, that at a certain point confronts this development itself in a most hostile way and has 
constantly to be overcome by way of crises […] Production comes to a standstill not at the point where 
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“plethora” of capital seeks higher profits in short-term, speculative investments or even 
frauds (e.g. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme in 2008) in the financial markets which finally leads 
to economic bubbles and crises (Marx, 1991, pp. 359-360). Thus, our main goal here is to 
examine if there is a declining trend in the rate of profit of the NFCB sector that may 
have led to the glut of fictitious capital in the financial sector and to the subsequent crisis.  
 
2.3. The Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall as the 
Marxian interpretation of crisis and criticism to it 
Marx’s LTRPF was first developed and formulated as a Marxian approach to economic 
crises by Henryk Grossman in the period right before the financial crash and the Great 
Depression.
8
 He thought that in the process of capitalist development the implementation 
of new technological innovations in the production would lead the OCC to rise at a 
higher rate than the rate of exploitation. Once the influence of the “counteracting factors” 
on the law is exhausted, the capitalist system will eventually, through increasingly more 
intense periodical crises, break down (Grossmann, 1992, pp. 29-32).  
It is obvious that Grossmann, alike most of the supporters of the 
underconsumptionist approach, develops his theory of crisis into a “determinist- 
necessitarian” “theory of the collapse” of capitalism (Milios et al., 2002, p. 149). Later 
on, other economists, with Maurice Dobb (1937, pp. 79-126) and Ernest Mandel (1995) 
being the most prominent among them, accepted the determinative influence of the 
LTRPF in the emergence of crises but in a “non-determinist” manner, as they were of the 
view that the law has only temporary power which after the impact of the 
countertendencies would lead to the restoration of the profit rate to pro-crisis levels 
(Milios et al., 2002, p. 149). In a similar contemporary account, Carchedi (2011) states 
that the outcome of the profit rate depends on the interaction between the tendency and 
its several countertendencies. Mandel (1995) also develops a theory of “long waves” 
where the LTRPF holds a central position and according to which long-term fluctuations 
in the rate of profit define the different phases of development. He argues that in the 
upper turning points of the “long wave” (i.e. the crisis), which precede the depressive 
phase, as well as during that period (which lasts approximately 20 to 30 years and is of 
similar duration with the expansionary phase) the economy is characterized by lower 
profit rates, sluggish rates of growth and accumulation, and high unemployment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
needs are satisfied, but rather where the production and realization of profit impose this” (Marx, 1991, pp. 
349-350, 367). 
8
 Grossmann’s main ideas on crises can be found in his major work which in English is translated as The 
Law of Accumulation and Breakdown of the Capitalist System: Being also a Theory of Crises (Grossmann, 
1929, 1992). For a detailed account of his crisis theory as well as his overall work in relation to Marxist 
economic theory, politics, and philosophy see also Kuhn (2005, 2009). 
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In our view this approach is closer to Marx’s original writings, it is theoretically 
more solid, and has proven to be scientifically and empirically more accurate in the long 
run.
9
 Furthermore, this approach has the advantage that it can be compared and 
contrasted with other theories on long waves of capitalist development (long-term), 
economic cycles (medium-term), and business cycles (short-term) laid out by 
Kondratieff, Schumpeter, and Kuznets, and extended by Freeman & Perez and Schön in 
an attempt to draw wider conclusions on secular and temporal trends in profitability and 
cyclical fluctuations of the economy.
10
 However, many of the above mentioned authors 
concentrate more on the lower turning points and on the mechanisms, endogenous or 
exogenous, that drive the system out of the depression and into a new expansionary 
phase, whereas our focus is on the upper turning points, the crises, and the inherent 
elements of the capitalist economy that produce them. 
Grossman’s crisis interpretation has received valid criticism from many 
scholars.
11
 Natalie Moszkowska (1935, pp. 45-49) developed a critique of Grossman’s 
concept some years after him, where she claimed that the technologies implemented after 
World War I would not cause a declining tendency in the rate of profit, but quite the 
opposite, at least in the long run, because of a simultaneous increase in rate of surplus 
value and a decrease in the organic composition of capital (as a result of labor 
productivity increasing faster than the technical composition of capital through these 
innovations). The weakness of Moszkowska’s work was that she did not provide any 
empirical analysis or data of that period that would justify her theoretical thesis (Milios et 
al., 2002, p. 149).  
The LTRPF as such has received both criticism and support from a broad 
spectrum of academic scholars on its validity and its centrality for Marxian economics. 
The most widely known critique of the LTRPF was published in 1961 by the Japanese 
Marxian economist Nobuo Okishio, who developed an economic model assuming that 
real wages remain constant and new techniques of production that substitute living labor 
with machinery are introduced only if they reduce the production cost per unit of output 
(Okishio, 1961, 1993). Under these assumptions, he asserted that the rate of profit would 
in every case rise and under no circumstances fall after the implementation of a labor-
replacing and cost-cutting technology. Sixty years earlier, another Marxist theoretician, 
                                                 
9
 One should always bear in mind that Marx’s writings should not be interpreted in a “deterministic” way, 
as his theory is developed as a dialectical approach of the innate dynamics of the capitalist system, whose 
outcome always varies and depends on the specific historical context (Tabb, 2010). Besides that, the 
assumption that Marx’s work provides the totality of theoretical and methodological tools to assess the 
current crisis conjuncture is groundless. 
10
 See further in Schumpeter and Fels (1939), Kuznets (1940), Kondratieff and Stolper (1935), C. Freeman 
and Perez (1988), and Lennart  Schön (2008) for an explanation of business cycles, long swings, and long 
waves. The scope and limitations of this paper do not allow for a more detailed presentation. 
11
 For a critique to Grossman’s “teleological” approach see Milios et al. (2002, pp. 148, 175-176),and 
Bukharin, in Luxemburg, Bucharin, & Tarbuck (1972, pp. 204, 262-263) 
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Mikhail von Tugan-Baranowsky, had criticized the LTRPF under similar assumptions as 
Okishio and had come to similar results concerning the validity of the law (Milios et al., 
2002, pp. 150-156; Tugan-Baranowsky, 2000). 
The refutation of the LTRPF by the “Okishio theorem” reignited the fuse in the 
continuing debate among (mainly Marxist) scholars with regard to its validity and 
produced a new wave of critics and supporters (Roemer, 1981; Shaikh, 1978a, 1978b). 
The most recent episode in that series of theoretical dispute was sparked by the refutation 
of the “Okishio theorem” by the proponents of the so-called “Temporal Single-System 
Interpretation (TSSI)” of Marx’s Value Theory and their assertion that the LTRPF is 
valid and internally consistent. According to this approach the refutation of the “Okishio 
theorem” lies in the argument that the constant fixed capital stock (net or gross) of any 
given firm in the economy must be calculated according to its historical-cost (HC) value 
(the value at the time of purchase) and not by its current-cost (CC) valuation because it is 
not devalued by future technological advances and increases in productivity that cheapen 
it or make it impossible to realize all the value that is embodied in it before its 
replacement (i.e. there is no moral depreciation).
12
 To read further on the arguments of 
the advocates of the TSSI approach see Kliman (1997, 2007); Kliman and Freeman 
(2000a, 2000b); and Kliman and McGlone (1999). For the arguments of the other side of 
the controversy, the defenders of the “Okishio theorem”, see Foley (2000); Laibman 
(1999, 2000a, 2000b).  
In this paper, our concern is to examine the potential role of the LTRPF in the 
emergence of crises and not the purely theoretical and mathematical debate that revolves 
around the law and/or the “Okishio theorem”. In our view, the validity of both the 
LTRPF and the “Okishio theorem” can be mathematically proven on the ground of 
different assumptions. The essence of the debate nevertheless, has to be sought in how 
representative and scientifically accurate of the “real-world” conditions of capitalist 
development these different assumptions are. This discussion is however beyond the 
boundaries of the present research project. In conclusion, we can say that despite the fact 
that we do not embrace a dogmatic view according to which Marx was inerrable in 
everything he wrote, nor do we believe that this specific view has anything to offer to the 
theoretical strength, credibility, and advancement of Marxian economics, we are totally in 
agreement with the following statement by Duncan Foley: 
  
                                                 
12
 Marx develops the concept of moral depreciation in the first Volume of Capital: “If, as a result of a new 
invention, machinery of a particular kind can be produced with a lessened expenditure of labour, the old 
machinery undergoes a certain amount of depreciation, and therefore transfers proportionately less value 
to the product. […] But in addition to the material wear and tear, a machine also undergoes what we might 
call a moral depreciation. It loses exchange-value, either because machines of the same sort are being 
produced more cheaply than it was, or because better machines are entering into competition with it” 
(Marx, 1990, pp. 318, 528). 
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“The power and usefulness of Marx‟s analysis of exploitation as the central 
social relation of capitalist society does not stand or fall on technical details 
of matrix algebra or difference equations. The notion that technical gaps in 
Marx‟s discussion of the transformation problem undermine his theory of 
exploitation is a line of argument largely advanced by Ricardian and 
marginalist critics of Marx whose motivation is to discredit rather than to 
clarify its contribution” (1999, p. 233). 
3. Data and method 
3.1. Main data sources and basic methodology 
The main sources of data are the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the 
Fixed Asset (FA) tables, which are produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
of the US Department of Commerce. The primary source of data on profit flows is the 
BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14, which decomposes the Gross Value Added (GVA) produced by 
the domestic CB and NFCB sectors into its different components. Data on the net stock 
of private fixed assets stem from the BEA’s FA Tables 6.1 and 6.3. These three tables are 
the main sources used in the empirical analysis, but additional data may be deduced from 
other sources and will be utilized to account for shortcomings in the BEA data. 
The calculations made in order to obtain profit rates and other figures, as well as 
all the sources of secondary data, will be explicitly presented in Appendix B (Endnotes). 
This will add to the transparency of the empirical analysis, so that any reader can easily 
find the data and replicate the calculations to find the same results. 
The measures that will be utilized in the empirical analysis as profit rates are in essence 
different versions of the net fixed capital return, i.e. different profit flow measures 
divided by the net stock of fixed assets (CC or HC) of the previous year. The figures 
provided by the BEA for the stock of corporate fixed capital are end-of year estimates, 
thus we divide the profit flow figure of the given year by the value of the preceding year 
for the net stock of capital, to extract the profit rate for the given year. 
The equation that will be used to calculate these figures can generally be 
expressed with the following equation: 
  
 
 
 ,      (2) 
where ρ is the rate of profit, Π is the profit flow, and Κ is the net stock of fixed capital. 
What distinguishes these different versions is firstly, the variable that is operationalized 
to account for the profit flows, and secondly, the way the net stock of fixed capital is 
estimated.  
The annual profit rate series will be filtered with the widely acknowledged 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, which was initially presented by the two authors in their 
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famous 1981 article, in order to distinguish the trend and the cyclical component of the 
time series, which is essential in our analysis (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997).
13
 The HP filter 
is capable of revealing whether the profit-rate time series display a secular trend or 
whether their movements follow a cyclical pattern through time. For the abovementioned 
reasons, the HP filter will also be utilized in all other time series dealing with 
macroeconomic indicators of the US economy. The smoothness of the estimated trend as 
well as the form of the estimated cycle depend largely on the value of the smoothing 
parameter λ. Here we will use the commonly accepted values of 100 for annual data and 
1600 for quarterly data. 
 
3.2. Qualitative and quantitative methodological issues 
The methodological issues that arise in the quest of calculating profit rates and estimating 
profitability trends for the different corporate sectors are huge and there is no consensus 
among the scholars who have undertaken such research on which is the optimal definition 
or measure to be used in analysis. Those issues pertain to both the nominator (profit 
flows) and the denominator (fixed capital stock) in the equation of the profit rate. The 
operationalization of the Marxian concepts and variables in terms of economic statistics 
and national accounts systems is a challenging task. 
3.2.1. Current-cost (CC) vs. historical-cost (HC) valuation of the net stock of 
fixed capital  
 
The biggest issue concerns the denominator of the equation, that is, the calculation of the 
net stock of capital (private corporate fixed assets) either with current costs (also called 
replacement and market costs) or with historical costs. The detailed definitions that the 
BEA ascribes to these two methods used to measure the stock of fixed capital are 
available in Appendix B and can be summed up as follows.
i
  The CC method expresses 
the value of the net stock of capital in any given year in prices of that year, i.e. the 
amount (of value) that would be necessary to buy that specific stock of capital in the 
given year (BEA, 2003, pp. M-8). The HC method reflects the value of the stock of 
capital at the time of its original purchase and is estimated in a manner that resembles the 
accounting and bookkeeping techniques that companies use to produce financial reports 
and statements (BEA, 2003, pp. M-10).  
 Kim (2012), to name one of the many, claims that HC valuation of the net stock 
of capital is an inconsistent, irrelevant, and unreliable variable when it comes to 
calculating profit rates and assessing profitability trends, and that the only representative 
                                                 
13
 The application of the HP-filter on the several time series was done in Excel 2010, using the HP-filter 
Add-In designed by Kurt Annen, which is available on the Internet at: 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/dge/qmrbcd/165.html. 
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way of measuring the capital stock is the replacement cost method. As has been 
mentioned earlier, in section 2, the HC valuation of the constant capital is promoted by 
some proponents of the TSSI approach, and mainly by Andrew Kliman (2012), who 
argues that the profit rate which is based on CC valuation is not a profit rate at all. His 
main argument in this debate, that there is no “moral depreciation” of constant capital 
throughout its lifecycle, has been discussed earlier. In our understanding, Marx supported 
the CC valuation of fixed capital firmly. In addition, this method has been adopted by the 
vast majority of scholars who have examined long-term profitability trends (e.g. 
(Brenner, 1998; Duménil & Lévy, 2002; Economakis, Anastasiadis, & Markaki, 2010; 
Michl, 1988; Moseley, 1991; Roberts, 2010; Shaikh, 2010; Weisskopf, 1979). 
In a new article that was published this year, Basu (2013) argues that in the 
postwar period of US capitalism (1946-2010), profitability trends are not affected by the 
choice between HC or CC valuation of the net capital stock. He claims that there is a 
threshold rate of inflation for capital goods for which percentage changes between the 
two ways of measurement remain constant. According to his calculations, the entire 
postwar period in the US was one where the average rate of inflation in the price of 
capital goods equaled the threshold value. That being the case, the percentage changes 
(not the levels) in profit rates with both approaches, and subsequently the profitability 
trends in the long run, would not alter in accord with the different capital stock valuation 
methods. Despite the fact that we theoretically support the CC valuation for the 
aforementioned reasons, we acknowledge the contribution of the TSSI proponents in the 
advancement of Marxian theory, and crisis theory in particular. In order to do justice to 
both approaches we will utilize both methods of capital stock valuation in the empirical 
analysis and see if Basu’s conclusion can be corroborated by our calculations. The focus 
of the discussion however will be on CC profitability trends. When the use of the HC net 
stock valuation method is not explicitly stated in the text, the reader can assume that the 
CC valuation method is implied. 
3.2.2. Profit flow measures 
As far as the calculation of profit flows is concerned, the main point of question is 
whether to use before-tax or after-tax profit flows. This should presumably affect the 
levels and to some extent also the fluctuations of the profit rates, as US governments’ 
policy concerning the taxation of corporate profits was fairly stable after World War II 
and until 1987, but changed to the benefit of big corporations after that.
14
 The average 
ratio of taxes to corporate profits is 40% for the period under discussion.
ii
  
                                                 
14
 Federal Corporate Income Tax Rates declined by 12% in 1987, from 46% to 34%, for enterprises with 
income that exceeded $335,000USD (Source: Treasury Department; Commerce Clearing House (CCH); 
Tax Foundation). 
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What is more, measuring homogenous profit flows for miscellaneous sectors 
(productive, commercial, financial capital) in a globalized economic environment can be 
a very demanding accounting task, but it is unlikely to find data that are more 
comprehensive on corporate income flows than those provided by the American 
statistical institutions, and more specifically by the BEA (Tabb, 2010). In order to avoid 
such implications four different variants of the profit flow will be used to calculate and 
compare profit rates and see if their trends display similar tendencies. These four 
measures, from the broadest to the narrowest are the, NVA-L, the Net Operating Surplus 
– NOS, the Before Tax Profits – BTP, and the After Tax Profits – ATP.15 The four profit 
rates that will result from these measures will be called Total Surplus-Value Rate – 
TSVR, Net Operating Surplus Rate – NOSR, Before Tax Profit Rate – BTPR, and After 
Tax Profit Rate – ATPR. Despite the fact that all four measures will be utilized, we agree 
with Weisskopf (1979), in the point he makes that before-tax profit flows precede after-
tax profit flows both temporally and conceptually, and are thus more relevant in the 
examination of business decisions driven by profitability, as taxes affect businesses’ 
investment decisions only secondarily. 
Another limitation in the analysis of profit flows is that a large part of upper 
managerial income, such as bonuses, that is calculated as employee compensation, is in 
essence profit income. This restriction in the data may have an underestimating effect on 
profits, especially in the recent years before the crisis, when high-profile executives 
(“golden boys”) of large firms were receiving big payments from dividends. Apart from 
that, some Marxist researchers do not include the entire corporate sector in their analysis, 
because they make a distinction between productive and unproductive labour, i.e. labour 
that produces value and surplus value in production activities in contrast with labor 
employed in circulation and supervisory activities (see further in Moseley (1992)). This 
issue will not be treated here.  
Finally, there is no distinction in the BEA’s NIPA tables between profit flows 
produced within the country or abroad. This is a major setback, as this distinction would 
allow us to account for developments in international competition that have had a large 
impact on American manufacturing. Undoubtedly, the estimation of these figures, which 
requires the additional use of the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve – Fed, 
would add to the external validity of this project. However, a task as laborious as that is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
                                                 
15
 NVA-L = Net Value Added minus Employee Compensation. This profit measure is closer than any other 
to what could be measured as total surplus value as Marx defined it the 3
rd
 Volume of Capital. If you 
subtract Taxes on production and imports less subsidies from this number, you get the NOS. If you further 
subtract Net interest & miscellaneous payments (NIP) and Business current transfer payments (BCTP) from 
the NOS you get the BTP. Finally, ATP is the difference between BTP and Taxes on corporate income. All 
the aforementioned measures include Inventory Valuation Adjustment – IVA and Capital Consumption 
Adjustment – CCAdj. 
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3.2.3. Why the US corporate business sector? 
In this part, the motivation behind the choice of country, period, and sectors for analysis 
will be summarized. To begin with, the choice of the US economy, although not the only 
available option, is quite evident in the investigation of processes that relate to the innate 
dynamics of capitalist development. The United States remain, and will be for some years 
to come, the greatest capitalist economy of the world. As such, it is reasonable to assume 
that the endogenous forces in the process of capital accumulation and technological 
progress are more apparent in the core of the global free market economy. The same 
approach was followed by Marx in his economic works, as his main area of study was the 
economy of 19
th
 century-Britain, which at that time was the most developed capitalist 
nation of the world. Besides that, reliable macroeconomic data for every aspect of the 
postwar US economy can be very easily retrieved from the internet without any 
restrictions, something that is essential when time restrictions on the completion of a 
research project exist.  
Second, the period under scrutiny is selected for a variety of reasons. Limitation 
of data does not constitute one of them, since the data series on profit flows and fixed 
assets available from BEA go back to 1929. The decision to focus on the postwar period 
up until 2011 was made to narrow down the scope of the paper and focus more on the 
current crisis in reference with 1970s crisis, which is widely considered as a profitability 
crisis. The inclusion of the Great Depression and the war period in our analysis would 
have required a far greater amount of time for the consideration of a number of 
exogenous factors that could potentially distort our theoretical focal point. In the chosen 
period, it is easier to compare and contrast similarities and differences in profitability 
trends between the two crises, and check if the different profit measures indicate a 
restoration of profit levels to pro-crisis peak levels.  
Finally, the choice of restricting the empirical analysis to the CB sector of the US 
economy is made for a variety of reasons that have also been noted by the majority of 
researchers who have undertaken similar research and followed this approach (Basu & 
Vasudevan, 2013; Duménil & Lévy, 2002, 2004; Economakis et al., 2010; Kliman, 
2012). The main reason behind this decision is that throughout the period under 
investigation, the corporate sector covers approximately 75 percent on average, of the 
total domestic business income and the total business fixed assets. This means that during 
this period, three quarters of the total constant capital were owned by the corporate 
sector, from which in succession three quarters of the total business income were 
generated. The nonfinancial corporate sector in particular, which accounts for roughly 92 
percent of the corporate sector’s total activity (in terms of net fixed assets and net value 
added), is considered to be the most representative of the US economy’s capitalist core 
(Bowles, Gordon, & Weissskopf, 1986).
iii
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4. Heterodox interpretations of the crisis 
4.1. A small note on the historical debate on the stagflation crisis 
The structural crisis of the 1970s had also been in the center of the debate on causal 
mechanisms that come into play before the manifestation of a crisis. The theoretical 
accounts that were proposed in an attempt to explain this crisis once more differed 
largely. Nonetheless, there was a wide consensus on the declining trend of the profit rate 
that characterized the period of gradual attenuation of the postwar growth dynamics in 
the advanced capitalist economies (Basu & Vasudevan, 2013). A reflection upon the 
theoretical accounts that were promoted to explain the fall in the rate of profit in that 
period is necessary in order to comprehend the basis of the current debate.  
A concept that remains dominant for the explanation of the crisis in the 1970s is 
the “profit squeeze” or “rising strength of labor” theory. According to this theory, the root 
of the crisis is found in eroding profitability, which is the result of an increasing wage 
share in total output at the detriment of the profit share during the expansionary phase of 
the cycle. This is in turn attributed to intense class struggle and rising labor power 
(Boddy & Crotty, 1975; Glyn & Sutcliffe, 1972; Weisskopf, 1979; Wolff, 1986). This 
process was indeed evident in the postwar “Golden Age” of capitalism, where most of the 
advanced economies aimed at full-employment levels, which gave the working classes 
increased negotiation power in the promotion of their interests through strong 
unionization (Maddison, 1991). 
 
Figure 1. Share of Employee Compensation (L), Wage and salary accruals (W), and Total Average 
Weekly Earnings (secondary axis) in the Net National Income, 1946-2011, Annual Figures with HP-
filtered trends
iv
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As we can observe in Figure 1, during this period the share of Employee Compensation 
(L) and in the Net National Income (NNI) rose by more than 10% (from 35.2% in 1946 to 
46.04% in 1980) and the share of Wages (W) in the NNI rose by 5% during the same 
period (from 33.48% to 38.45%).
16
 The increasing difference between L and W can be 
attributed to the fact that an increasingly larger portion of labor income is in the form of 
benefits and supplements to the salary (pension and welfare, social and health insurance 
funds, and so forth). However, the specific concept is not useful when examining the 
current crisis in the US, because real wages have generally stagnated or fallen in the 
period after the late 1960s-early 1970s, and so has the wage share (CEA, 2012). In 2010, 
the share of L in NNI had fallen to 37.53%, almost reaching its 1946 level. In the same 
year, the share of W in NNI had fallen well below its 1946 level to a record low of 
30.98% for the postwar period. If we further examine the weakest groups of working 
people in the American society, the production/nonsupervisory workers in private 
nonagricultural industries, we will find that their real wages have remained stagnant 
around an average of circa 282 USD, and that the share of their income in the NNI is 
steadily falling after 1966 up until to this day (CEA, 2012).
17
 
Other explanations focused on technological rather than distributional factors that 
would explain the declining trend in profitability. The rise in the organic composition of 
capital as a result of labor-saving technical change was one of the main (Shaikh, 1987). 
Fred Moseley (1992), another Marxist academic from the US, ascribed the profitability 
crisis to the relative increase of unproductive labor vis-à-vis productive labor. The 
exhaustion of the favorable technological and institutional advancements of the postwar 
period, which had led to the reallocation of resources and to the structural change of the 
economy, by the late 1960s – early 1970s, is the rationale promoted by Dumenil and 
Levy (1999) to explain the slowdown in productivity growth and the fall in the rate of 
profit.
18
 
The 1970s crisis was also attributed to productive overcapacity of the monopoly-
capitalist economy, which is accompanied by inadequacy of effective consumption and 
investment and thus has a tendency towards stagnation by the “Monthly Review School” 
(Baran & Sweezy, 1966; Magdoff & Sweezy, 1981). Another contributor to the Monthly 
Review, Robert Brenner (1998, 2006), identified the increasing intensity of international 
competition between the leading industrial economies (US, Germany, Japan), as the 
reason behind shrinking profit margins and overcapacity in the manufacturing sector, 
where he located the core of the crisis. In a similar fashion with the profit squeeze theory, 
                                                 
16
 Wages = Wage and salary accruals = Employee compensation minus benefits and supplements to wages 
and salaries 
17
 Employee Compensation for the entire corporate sector is probably an overestimation of working class 
income, because it includes upper management and executive incomes that are in essence profits (see p.16). 
18
 For additional approaches on the saturation of the “Golden Age” growth dynamics (1946-1973) see more 
in Abramovitz (1986), Dumke (1990), Eichengreen (2007), and Temin (2002). 
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the supporters of the Social Structures of Accumulation theory (SSA) saw the root of the 
crisis in diminishing labor productivity and falling work intensity, which was the 
outcome of the, beneficial for labor, postwar SSA (Bowles, Gordon, & Weisskopf, 1983). 
 
4.2. The current debate 
The element that distinguishes the controversy this time is that the unprecedented 
collapse of the banking and wider monetary sector in many economies has highlighted 
the financial aspect of this crisis, which has been acknowledged by the majority of 
authors (Choonara, 2009). The role of the monetary sector in the unfolding of crises has 
also been treated by Marx, but in a more descriptive manner, when he discusses English 
banking crises (Tabb, 2010). The dispute arises when it comes to whether the systemic 
root of the crisis is founded primarily in the financial sector, which only secondarily 
affects the “real” economy, or vice versa, if it is based on the overall problematic 
performance of the nonfinancial enterprises that fostered the process of financialization 
and amplified its effects.
19
 
This study is mainly concerned with the group of scholars that investigate the 
latter question. In the following section, a very brief overview of the main arguments of 
the financialization explanations will be made. Afterwards, the alternative interpretations 
of the Great Recession that highlight the importance of the profit rate, in reference with 
the debate on the causes of the stagflation crisis where needed, will be made. 
4.2.1. The financialization approach 
Robin Blackburn (2008), was one of the first who identified the problem in the subprime 
mortgage market and attributed the crisis that followed the credit crunch to the 
weaknesses of the “Anglo-Saxon” model of capitalism which promotes privatization, 
deregulation of the global financial markets, and instability. For the late Peter Gowan 
(2009), the root of the crisis was founded within finance itself, and more specifically in 
the emergence of the “New Wall Street System” which produced new kinds of  actors, 
agents, practices, and dynamics in the financial markets that were the primary forces 
behind the malaise of the US economy. Loosening or repeal of laws such as the Glass–
Steagall Act which regulated capital markets and banking procedures have also been 
promoted as explanations for the augmentation of consumer finance and “casino-
capitalism” (see for example Lapavitsas, 2009, 2010, 2011) .  
 Foster and Magdoff (2009), following the “Monthly Review” tradition and 
extending on the work of Veblen, Schumpeter, Keynes, Kalecki, Steindl, and Minsky, 
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 “As long as the social character of labour appears as the monetary existence of the commodity and 
hence as a thing outside actual production, monetary crises, independent of real crises or as an 
intensification of them, are unavoidable” (Marx, 1991, p. 649). Defining which is the primary and which 
the secondary element in this causal relation is the kernel of the question on the current crisis. 
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claim that this is a crisis of the monopoly-finance capitalism, since financial bubbles are 
the means by which the economy attempts to overcome the underlying tendency towards 
stagnation in late capitalism. The inflated financial sector has become the “waste” area of 
our times, much like what military spending was for the US in the 1960s, according to 
Sweezy, Baran, and H. Magdoff. In fact, these bubbles, the authors maintain, only 
intensify, rather than reverse the long-term stagnation tendency of the economy through 
debt expansion. On a second level, this leads to the magnification of the “real world” 
repercussions of the crisis. 
Lapavitsas sees the crisis as the result of “financial expropriation” of profits from 
wages and salaries by the banking system, as he claims that workers have to cover many 
of their needs (health, education, insurance and so forth) which were privatized in the 
neoliberal era through debt (Lapavitsas, 2009, 2011). In a like manner, Moseley (2011) 
asserts that profit rates have largely recovered after the previous crisis of profitability at 
the expense of increased exploitation and stagnant real wages of the working classes, a 
view also shared by McNally (2009). This, claims the former, has led to increased 
household indebtedness and over-indebtedness in the financial sector as a whole, which is 
the basis of the feebleness of the US economy. Duménil and Lévy (2011a), in their latest 
book and in a series of articles dedicated to the present structural crisis, associate it with 
neoliberal-specific attributes in the era of the US political and economic dominance in the 
“world stage”. They maintain that the current problematic performance of the US 
economy is the outcome of increased contradictions in the international competition, a 
“trajectory of cumulative disequilibria […] that the international hegemony of the 
country rendered possible” (Duménil & Lévy, 2011b). 
The importance of technology (Information and Communication Technologies – 
ICTs), financial innovation, and financial engineering in the diffusion of the crisis 
through financial instruments such as derivatives (mainly collateralized debt obligations 
and credit default swaps) has also been stretched in several articles (Bryan & Rafferty, 
2008; Lapavitsas & Dos Santos, 2008). Steve Keen (2011) developed a novel approach, 
which extends upon Hyman Minsky’s theory of the inherent instability in the financial 
sector and Irving Fisher’s theory of debt deflation to give an endogenous explanation of 
the crisis. Another such account is presented by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), who argue 
that in periods prior to systemic banking crises, bubbles in asset prices, large capital 
inflows and credit booms are a common characteristic and that in the aftermath of such 
crises central government debt increases significantly with a certain time lag.  
These approaches are very significant in the course of uncovering the principal 
forces that defined the financial dimension of the crisis and its forms of manifestation in 
this historically specific socioeconomic environment. Even though they consider 
structural processes that arose in the neoliberal era, they focus mainly on exogenous 
factors and policy implications that are associated with this specific development model 
and are not inherent in capitalism. That is why within this group of scholars the crisis is 
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perceived as a result of the dominance of finance in economic activity and not as the 
outcome of a wider problematic performance of capitalist production.  
In our view however, these approaches were more relevant in the early phase of 
the financial slump, when the broader economic implications of the current crisis for the 
nonfinancial sectors were apparent neither in the US nor in Europe. Hence, in the recent 
conjuncture, and without underrating the importance of the financialization process, the 
principal causes of the crisis have to be sought in the entire spectrum of economic 
activity. Finally, one needs to point to the fact that, although most of the abovementioned 
scholars originate from a Marxist background, those interpretations owe more 
theoretically to Keynes and especially Minsky, rather than Marx, for the reason that their 
analysis is not based on concepts such as value, capital, accumulation, productivity, profit 
rate and so on.
20
 
4.3. The dispute over profitability trends 
What is striking in the case of the contemporary dispute among Marxist scholarship is 
that there is no general assent on the cardinal issue of the empirical trend in profitability, 
mainly in the years after 1982 and until today. Whether or not the profit rate in the US 
CB and NFCB sectors recovered in this period to its previous high levels or whether it 
displayed a long-term declining trend that keeps it stagnating below the pre-1970’s high 
levels, remains to be seen in our empirical analysis. 
 From the scholars that have engaged in the empirical inquiry of profitability 
trends in reference with the current crisis, two distinct groups can be identified. First, 
those who recognize a secular declining trend in the rate of profit or at least the 
incapacity of the economy to revive profitability to previous high levels. Second, those 
who observe that the rate of profit has to a large extent recovered in the previous years 
and focus more on demand-side explanations of the crisis. The theoretical and 
methodological dissimilarities in the calculation of profit rates have been discussed 
before. Only the findings of the various scholars that have treated this issue will be 
presented here. 
 Amongst those who have undertaken such kind of empirical research and 
maintain that profit rates have more or less recovered in the years after 1982, which 
means that they do not classify the Great Recession as a profitability crisis, are Duménil 
and Lévy (2011a, 2012); Mohun (2006, 2009); Moseley (2008, 2011). These authors 
conclude in their works that profitability trended upward in the period after 1982 and thus 
seek the causes of the crisis elsewhere. These explanations have been discussed earlier. In 
summary, the kernel of their thesis lies broadly in the process of structural restructuring 
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 “The main problem in the current crisis is the financial sector […] [t]he best theorist of the capitalist 
financial system is Hyman Minsky, not Karl Marx. The current crisis is more of a Minsky crisis than a 
Marx crisis” (Moseley, 2008). 
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of the US economy in the neoliberal era through financialization and deregulation of 
capital markets, whose main attributes are increased dominance of capital over labor, 
rising income inequality (especially between upper management and production or 
nonsupervisory workers), lack of effective demand, massive expansion of household 
debt, macroeconomic disequilibria (twin deficits) and global imbalances (rising external 
government debt). 
The scholars that have associated the present structural crisis in some way with 
eroding profitability are Brenner (2006, 2008); Carchedi (2009, 2011); Economakis et al. 
(2010); A. Freeman (2009); Kliman (2012); Kotz (2009); Roberts (2010); and Shaikh 
(1999). 
Brenner’s account has been discussed in relation to the 1970s crisis. In assessing 
the Great Recession, he follows the same conceptual framework and argues that this is a 
postponed crisis that displays the chronic problems of the accumulation process in the 
manufacturing sector caused by the intensification of international competition (Brenner, 
2006, 2008). The firm entrance of the Newly Industrialized Countries – NICs (East Asian 
Tigers, China, and India) in the global manufacturing map, amplified in his view, the 
overcapacity problem in the advanced capitalist countries and did not allow for the 
restoration of profit rates. Wage repression and cuts in government spending were 
promoted to reverse the fall in the profit rate with devastating results for aggregate 
demand and the stability of the economy. The policies that were followed to keep the 
economy running smoothly, he claims, are the reason behind the debt explosion in the 
US. In a comparable approach, Kotz (2009) ascribes the crisis to overcapacity caused by 
overinvestment in asset bubbles. Once the bubble bursts, falling capacity utilization 
drives down profit rates and consequently investment and demand. 
Alan Freeman (2009) associates the profitability crisis with the long-term increase 
in the organic composition of capital caused by the introduction of labor-substituting 
technology. He supports that this is historically depicted in the development of the 
output-capital ratio and not in that of the profit share, which would mean that distribution 
outweighs technological changes in the movement of the profit rate. Carchedi (2011), 
Kliman (2012), Roberts (2010), and Shaikh (1999) also share this opinion, although 
Carchedi argues that the tendency of the rate of profit to fall has been to some degree 
counterbalanced by the rising rate of exploitation after 1987. Economakis et al. (2010), 
using the most advanced econometric model for the decomposition of the profit rate in 
related literature that we are aware of, find that during different upward or downward 
periods from 1929 to 2008, some factors are statistically more significant and strong in 
explaining the variance of the profit rate than others. Nevertheless, the authors argue that 
in the long run, both the evolution of real wages (distribution) and the composition of 
capital (technology) in relation to labor productivity, which is the most significant 
determinant, have a combined effect on the fluctuations of the profit rate.  
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According to Economakis et al. (2010) and Kliman (2009), the restoration of the 
profit rate to healthy levels after the stagflation crisis has not occurred, because the 
massive destruction of capital that took place during the Great Depression and the Second 
World War, has been avoided this time through government aid to corporations in the 
fear of unprecedented events that could have a severe effect on the already fragile 
accumulation process in the US.
21
 In the following section the empirical results will be 
analyzed in reference with the abovementioned accounts to see which approach best 
captures the reality of the profit rate movements. 
5. Results 
The mechanisms through which profit rates affect the macroeconomic performance of an 
economy have already been underlined. The theoretical framework under which 
profitability trends are associated with the emergence of structural crises, as well as 
previous research on the subject, has also been presented. What remains, is the analysis 
of our empirical findings, which will follow in this section. 
5.1. Profit Rates 
I will broadly distinguish the period between 1946 and 2011 in two major phases, using 
the entire range of socioeconomic, political, and institutional characteristics that defined 
them. 
The first period from 1946 to 1980 is the era of what has been called the postwar 
“social compromise”, which had started to fade already from the early 1970s and was 
mainly characterized by: government policies towards full employment; the dominance 
of Keynesian economics; a stable international monetary system with rather fixed 
exchange rates; big credit institutions that facilitated long-term productive investments in 
new capital goods and technologies; corporate governance focusing on constructive 
reinvestment of profits in return for wage moderation; strong unionization; and finally 
steady actions against protectionism in trade, labor, and capital movements (Maddison, 
1991).
22
 
                                                 
21
 Destruction of capital, does not only mean the physical destruction of tangible assets (use values in 
Marxian terms) that happened for example during WWII (buildings, plants, infrastructure and so on), but 
also the monetary devaluation of capital (exchange value in Marxian terms) as the term is used nowadays. 
22
 Under the Bretton Woods System, which  was a system  that  regulated  international monetary  policy, 
restrictions on capital mobility were imposed and exchange rates could only marginally fluctuate (+/- 1%) 
because currencies  of  the member countries were pegged to the US dollar which in turn was pegged to 
gold (Eichengreen, 2008, pp. 91-92). Multilateral trade was on the rise and was institutionally supported by 
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which oversaw tariff reductions. In this environment 
of limited capital mobility, rather fixed exchange rates, and open trade promotion developed countries were 
capable to exercise independent/expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that aimed at full employment 
(fundamental policy trilemma) (Findlay & O'Rourke, 2007, pp. 485-486). 
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The second period, from 1980 to 2011 is the era of globalization, with the US in 
the forefront, which saw the gradual prevalence of the wider service and financial sectors 
over the traditional goods-producing sectors in the West. The definitive attributes of this 
period that could be labeled as the era of neoliberal hegemony are: fiscal austerity aiming 
at price stability; lesser role of the state in the economy, mainly through privatization; 
free floating exchange rates, free trade, and further deregulation of capital markets; very 
weak unionization and declining labor strength; increased economic and political power 
concentration to elites; and predominance of neoclassical economics in academia and 
politics (Harvey, 2005). Within this broad historical perspective, we will attempt to 
assess the evolution of the profit rate for the CB and NFCB sectors in the US. 
5.1.1. Current-Cost (CC) Profitability Trends 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the four different profit rates of the CB and NFCB sectors, 
along with their HP-filtered trends, for the entire postwar period up to this day. A first 
impression from the visual observation of the graphs is that although the levels of the 
various profit rates are different, their fluctuations through time display a similar pattern. 
This is in fact verified by the closer inspection of the variances between the four profit 
measures, which more or less remain stable throughout this period. Nevertheless, the 
extent of the fluctuations in the different profit rates varies significantly, which affects the 
outcome of their evolution in time.  
 
 
Figure 2. Profit rates, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011 (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), 
Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
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Figure 3. Profit rates, US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011 (Current-Cost Net 
Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
vi
 
The two extended periods described before, can be further separated into four minor 
phases that are common in the movement of the profit rates. The first period from 1946 
until 1965 is a period of uniform profit rates with a slight upward trend towards the end 
of the 1950s. This small but rather sharp upward movement starts in the trough of 1958 
and reaches its peak in 1965, when the postwar growth dynamic is exhausted and the 
decay of the advanced capitalist economies that would lead to the prolonged crisis of the 
1970s begins. Nevertheless, this marginal trend is probably a result of business cycle 
fluctuations, although a safe inquiry into its causes would require going back in time, 
which is not in our intentions here. This era has not been termed as the “Golden Age” of 
capitalism without reason. The profit rates that corporations were able to achieve during 
these years are on average the highest of the entire period under examination. It is 
obvious from Table 1 that these rates of profit remain unmatched until today, despite the 
fact that the wage share was on the rise during this period (see Figure 1). What is more, 
the average annual growth during these years, which is calculated as a Compound Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) and presented in Table 2, is very high for both sectors, although 
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lower than the ones witnessed during the neoliberal rebound of 1980-1997.
23
 That is 
reasonable, because profit rates in 1946 were already high, so their rate of growth could 
not exhibit large values, as their margin of increase was low or fully exhausted. On the 
other hand, the profit rates in 1980 were at an all-time low, which explains their potential 
for high growth rates. 
Table 1. Average Profit Rates for selected periods, US Corporate Business and Nonfinancial 
Corporate Business Sectors, 1946-2011 (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation) 
Break-Point 
Periods 
TSVR NOSR BTPR ATPR 
CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB 
1946-1965 19.87% 19.21% 13.47% 12.84% 13.03% 11.85% 6.95% 6.22% 
1965-1980 18.34% 17.64% 12.08% 11.41% 10.45% 9.18% 5.92% 5.27% 
1980-1997 16.29% 15.84% 10.65% 9.99% 7.93% 6.96% 4.97% 4.68% 
1997-2011 16.96% 15.96% 11.50% 10.17% 9.36% 7.38% 6.32% 5.20% 
1946-2011 17.91% 17.22% 11.95% 11.14% 10.27% 8.95% 6.03% 5.34% 
 
In the second part of the first period, there is a huge decline in the profit rates of both 
sectors, which clearly signifies the undisputable role of eroding profitability in the 
stagflation crisis of the 1970s, as most scholars have indicated. Already from 1965, all 
profit rate measures had started falling and by 1980, their values had diminished by half 
or more. Moreover, the annual growth rates for this period display high negative values, 
which are not entirely counterbalanced by similar positive values in the following 
periods. 
Table 2. Compound Annual Growth in Profit Rates for selected periods, US Corporate Business and 
Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sectors, 1946-2011 (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation)
vii
 
Break-Point 
Periods 
TSVR NOSR BTPR ATPR 
CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB 
1946-1965 1.64% 1.71% 2.00% 2.17% 1.93% 2.00% 3.35% 3.88% 
1965-1980 -3.69% -3.92% -4.13% -4.57% -5.86% -6.26% -7.43% -7.64% 
1980-1997 2.14% 2.32% 2.52% 2.69% 3.61% 3.52% 5.74% 5.75% 
1997-2011 -0.61% -0.76% -0.45% -0.62% -0.69% -0.96% -0.29% -0.68% 
Trough-to-trough        
1958-2001 -0.17% -0.26% -0.15% -0.40% -0.79% -1.34% -0.24% -0.69% 
1958-2009 -0.17% -0.24% -0.10% -0.26% -0.50% -0.78% 0.12% -0.14% 
Peak-to-peak        
1965-1997 -0.67% -0.69% -0.69% -0.81% -0.99% -1.24% -0.70% -0.80% 
1965-2006 -0.62% -0.75% -0.59% -0.85% -0.74% -1.15% -0.63% -1.00% 
 
                                                 
23
 The CAGR is commonly used by companies to calculate the average annual growth in rates of return or 
rates of investment, thus making it a suitable measure to assess the progress of profit rates. In essence, the 
CAGR is the slope of the linear trend between two data points. 
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The third period signifies the resurgence of capital profitability, as the growth rates of the 
profit measures are again positive and the trends for the CB and NFCB sectors are 
ascending. Nevertheless, the average profit rates are the lowest among all other phases 
and these 17 years of significant increase were not enough to fully reverse the previous 
decline, excluding the ATPB in the CB sector, which recovered to a much bigger degree 
that the other rates. This obvious dissimilarity between the three broadest profit measures 
and the ATPR, which depends very much on taxation of corporate income, is substantial; 
it clearly displays the shift in government policy during the neoliberal era to the benefit 
of capital. The ATPR in the CB sector is the only measure that has reached an average 
close to that of the initial period and above the average for the entire period (see Table 1). 
Despite these favorable distribution policies for capital, all the profit rates in the NFCB 
sector, including the ATPR, remain lower than their CB equivalents. Besides that, the 
trough-to-trough and peak-to-peak average growth rates, which are better indicators of 
the performance of the sector within this long wave, are all negative and higher in 
absolute terms than the ones for the CB sector. 
 Finally, in the last period, that includes the Great Recession and the years leading 
up to it, the CAGRs of all profit measures are negative in both sectors. The average profit 
rates are slightly higher than in the preceding period, but still lower than in any other 
phase of the long wave and lower than the average rates for the whole period under 
scrutiny (except for the ATPR CB). In addition to that, the trend of the TSVR in both 
sectors is slightly descending and that of the other measures is leveling off. What is more, 
it is obvious from the peak-to peak and trough-to-trough CAGRs, that the long-term 
profitability in the CB and NFCB sectors, aside from the partial revival of profit rates 
during the 1980-1997 period, is one of declining or at best stagnating nature. This denotes 
that prior to the crisis, the accumulation process in the US economy was certainly 
problematic, and profit rates in the “real” economy may have led to the boom of the 
financial sector.  
 In Figure 4, we can see that there was an enormous increase in the Financial 
Corporate Business (FCB) sector’s share in BTP in 1998, after the exhaustion of the 
profit rate growth dynamic. While the sharp ascending trend and the boom in the share of 
financial profits in BTP, had started back in 1984, when the process of financialization 
was put forward as part of the wider neoliberal policy agenda to counteract the declining 
trend in profitability of the previous years, it was in the five years from 1998 to 2003 that 
this share skyrocketed from 23.3% to 40.2%, despite the burst of the dot-com bubble in 
2001.  
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Figure 4. Share of Corporate Financial Profits (Before-Tax) in Total Corporate Before-Tax Profits, 
1946-2011, Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
viii
 
 
5.1.2. Historical-Cost (HC) Profitability Trends 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 are analogous to Figures 2 and 3, with the only difference being 
that HC net stock valuation of private fixed assets replaced CC valuation in the 
denominator. The same goes for Table 3 and Table 4, which are equivalent to Table 1 and 
Table 2. However, as we will now see, this has a significant influence on the levels and 
trends of the profit rate time series. 
 The periodization that was followed before can be identified in these time series, 
only in the extreme values, in peak and trough years. Apart from that, these figures 
display a completely different evolution through time, specifically one of a secular 
declining trend, with no cyclical variations for the entire period under investigation. Only 
the BTPR and the ATPR in the CB sector display a very slightly ascending trend after 
1986 and all other measures in both sectors have a flat trend after 2001. 
 The differences between HC and CC valuation of the net stock of private fixed 
assets have been discussed before. HC values are consistently lower than CC values 
because the price index of capital assets was increasing throughout the whole period 
under research (Basu, 2013). Thus, as long as inflation in capital goods is positive, HC 
valuation will have an inflating effect on the rate of profit, which is why it significantly 
higher than the CC measure.  
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Figure 5. Profit rates, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011 (Historical-Cost Net Stock 
Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
ix
 
 
 
Figure 6. Profit rates, US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011 (Historical-Cost Net 
Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
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If we assess the HC profitability trends with the use of the HP-Filter, we can definitely 
conclude that there is a secular declining trend in the rate of profit, which is not reversed 
throughout this period, despite some short intervals of upward movement in the time 
series. If we further examine the average profit rates in Table 3, we will see that all of 
them are declining from preceding to succeeding period. Moreover, the averages for the 
last period of 1997-2011, which includes the years prior to the Great Recession, are 
significantly lower than the average for 1946 to 2011. 
 
Table 3. Average Profit Rates for selected periods, US Corporate Business and Nonfinancial 
Corporate Business Sectors, 1946-2011 (Historical-Cost Net Stock Valuation) 
Period 
TSVR NOSR BTPR ATPR 
CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB 
1946-1965 31.80% 30.80% 21.57% 20.61% 20.89% 19.06% 11.07% 9.93% 
1965-1980 28.36% 27.44% 18.66% 17.70% 16.03% 14.14% 9.03% 8.06% 
1980-1997 25.51% 25.21% 16.67% 15.89% 12.33% 11.05% 7.70% 7.39% 
1997-2011 24.39% 23.17% 16.56% 14.78% 13.48% 10.75% 9.10% 7.57% 
1946-2011 27.74% 26.89% 18.51% 17.41% 15.91% 14.00% 9.26% 8.29% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CAGRs for the different profit measures depict a similar image to that shown in 
Table 2. The sign (positive or negative) of the average annual growth rates is the same in 
every period, although we cannot really distinguish clear upward trending periods in the 
HC time series as before. Still, the difference in the absolute values of the CAGRs is 
noteworthy. Fluctuations in the CC profit rates are considerably larger than in the HC 
ones, at least when we examine the four distinct periods. Nonetheless, when it comes to 
the trough-to-trough and peak-to-peak analysis, the average annual growth rates are very 
close if we compare the figures from Table 2 and Table 4. The negative average decline 
is always larger (in absolute terms) in the HC profit rates for the trough-to-trough periods 
and smaller for the peak-to-peak periods, where CC profit rates display a larger average 
decline. 
 
Table 4. Compound Annual Growth in Profit Rates for selected periods, US Corporate Business and 
Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sectors, 1946-2011 (Historical-Cost Net Stock Valuation)
xi
 
Break-Point 
Periods 
TSVR NOSR BTPR ATPR 
CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB CB NFCB 
1946-1965 0.57% 0.68% 0.93% 1.13% 0.86% 0.96% 2.26% 2.82% 
1965-1980 -1.71% -1.90% -2.17% -2.56% -3.94% -4.28% -5.54% -5.69% 
1980-1997 0.51% 0.70% 0.88% 1.06% 1.96% 1.88% 4.05% 4.07% 
1997-2011 -0.24% -0.46% -0.08% -0.32% -0.32% -0.65% 0.09% -0.38% 
Trough-to-trough        
1958-2001 -0.51% -0.59% -0.50% -0.73% -1.13% -1.67% -0.59% -1.02% 
1958-2009 -0.32% -0.39% -0.25% -0.42% -0.65% -0.93% -0.03% -0.29% 
Peak-to-peak        
1965-1997 -0.56% -0.55% -0.58% -0.68% -0.89% -1.10% -0.59% -0.66% 
1965-2006 -0.33% -0.44% -0.29% -0.54% -0.44% -0.84% -0.34% -0.69% 
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The assessment of the HC profitability trends certainly leads to the conclusion that the 
secular trend in the profit rate is one of declining nature. This result however is “biased” 
because of the HC valuation method of the net stock of fixed capital, which does not 
account for the relative devaluation of constant capital, and is considered to be of lower 
theoretical relevance to the research subject than the CC valuation method. In spite of 
this, there are some interesting conclusions that can be drawn from the comparison of the 
results from the two distinct methods. First, both time series display that the long-term 
performance of the CB and NFCB sectors has been problematic, even after the partial 
revival of CC profit rates. Second, although the secular trend is not identical and the HC 
time series do not display evidence of long wave cyclical movements as the CC time 
series, Basu’s (2013) conclusion, that the average percentage changes in the profit rates 
between two end points (trough-to-trough and peak-to-peak) are similar for the entire 
postwar period, is validated by our results. Third, the CC series display significantly 
larger fluctuations in the period of drastic decline (1966-1980) and in the period of frail 
recovery (1980-1997) than the HC series. Finally, the only profit rate measure that has 
considerably recovered is the ATPR, which signifies a distribution of the total income 
produced that is more favorable to capital in the neoliberal era. 
 
5.1.3. Concluding remarks with regard to profitability trends 
The fact that the leading capitalist economy of the world has not been able to reach the 
profit rate levels of the first two postwar decades in the 50 years that have succeeded that 
period denotes the long-term problematic performance of the CB sector in the US 
economy. If one takes into consideration that the NFCB sector, that comprises more than 
90% of the CB sector and is the most significant and representative of US capitalism 
sector among all others, has functioned in a decreasingly effective way, then it is safe to 
assume that the structural aspect of the Great Recession lies within the accumulation 
process of the “real” economy.24  
Wage repression, government cuts, and financial (debt) expansion were the 
policies used to confront the profitability crisis of the 1970s. This process created the 
conditions for further accumulation, concentration, and centralization of capital in a few 
multinational corporations that supported the new development model. Private initiative 
became the central force of economic activity and these companies grew too big to fail, 
as their network of activities extends to every corner of the world and affects the healthy 
operation of many other businesses and organizations (suppliers, pension funds, banks 
etc.). The breakdown of corporations of that size, which have an almost institutional 
                                                 
24
 As these lines are written, the Detroit municipality, once the prosperous automotive and manufacturing 
capital of the US, has filed for bankruptcy after more than a decade of economic decay. 
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character in the age of neoliberalism, would potentially pull other productive sectors or 
profitable sections of the economy into a downward spiral. In spite of the dot-com bubble 
in 2001, investors and policy makers were not alarmed by the signs of structural 
weakness of the US economy and continued to seek outlets for profits in the financial 
markets (see Figure 4 and the consequent analysis). Growth once again relied on the 
build-up of an unsustainable bubble based on the vast expansion of household debt to fuel 
the subprime mortgage market. This development had no substantial benefits for the 
international competitiveness of the US economy, but rather amplified global imbalances 
(twin deficits and expansion of international public debt). When this bubble burst in 
2007, affecting the entire financial sector, which had built a huge amount of derivative 
products on top of mortgage loans, the structural instability of the US economy became 
more than apparent to all economic agents and led to the Great Recession. 
It has been argued by Dumenil and Levy (1999), that the 1970s crisis was caused 
by the saturation of the favorable postwar developments, in technology and institutions 
(diffusion of electrical mechanization, work standardization and managerial organization 
– Fordism), which had functioned effectively for about two decades under the specific 
historical socioeconomic environment that has been described before. In a similar 
manner, stemming from a technological long wave perspective, we could assess that the 
Great Recession may designate a crisis of the Third Industrial Revolution, namely that of 
the ICTs (microprocessor, computerization, Internet), that generated in the early 1970s 
and was widely diffused in production, with beneficial productivity effects, during the 
1990s (Lennart Schön, 2010).  
As in the case of the 1970s crisis, which represented the end of the postwar 
“social compromise” and the dominance of a new socioeconomic and institutional model 
of development that is widely referred to as neoliberalism, this crisis could potentially 
mean the end of this era, and the embarkation upon a new growth path for the global 
economy. However, for this to happen, there has to be a widespread destruction of 
capital, meaning that the “creative-destructive” tendencies and forces that are inherent in 
capitalism, have to be left free to act.
25
 The productive implementation of groundbreaking 
technologies requires the violent restructuring of the economy in order to yield a 
sustainable developmental trajectory. This development would probably create disruptive 
social tendencies (massive unemployment, devaluation of capital, destruction of entire 
sectors, radicalization of the masses and so on) that could potentially reach in extent and 
severity the Great Depression, and put the current socioeconomic and political status-quo 
at risk (Mackey, 2010). Policy makers, who are a fundamental agent of the existing 
                                                 
25
 The concept of capital destruction first appeared in Marx’s work and was later adopted by German 
sociologist-economist Werner Sombart, who developed the notion of “creative destruction”. This term later 
appeared in Joseph Schumpeter’s work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942), who put it in a long 
wave framework and emphasized the importance of technological innovations (Reinert & Reinert, 2006). 
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system of public relations, do not seem keen on assuming such a risk, as their actions to 
hinder these procedures have clearly shown.
26
  
5.2. Organic composition of capital (OCC) 
The relation of the OCC with the evolution of the profit rate has been discussed in section 
2.1 in reference with the LTRPF. When comparing the profit rate measure closest to the 
analysis of Marx, the TSVR, with the OCC in the NFCB sector we would expect that the 
latter would rise in the periods of declining profitability, because the countertendencies 
that would mitigate the fall in the profit rate would have saturated. This is indeed evident 
from the visual inspection of the two time series and their HP-filtered trends. The two 
time series display completely reverse movements and trends, which is a very interesting 
finding that calls for further research since it does not constitute in any definitive way a 
confirmation of the LTRPF but simply a suggestion towards that direction. 
 
Figure 7. TSVR and Organic composition of capital (secondary axis), US Nonfinancial Corporate 
Business Sector, 1946-2011, (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered 
trends
xii
 
To establish a sound causal relationship between the fluctuations of the two variables one 
would need to apply sophisticated econometric methods that lie out of our capabilities for 
                                                 
26
 The US bailout and stimulus programs that have been implemented so far to save the banking, financial, 
insurance, and automotive sectors have by far exceeded $1 trillion USD (Mackey, 2010). 
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the present paper. Nevertheless, we will examine if there is a negative linear association 
between the OCC, which is variable X and the TSVR, which is variable Y (lagged by one 
year). We will calculate the Pearson coefficient of correlation (r), the coefficient of 
determination (R
2
), and the t values of the correlation coefficient to determine its 
significance level.
27
 The null hypothesis H0, is that there is zero correlation between the 
two variables. The correlation of the two continuous variables is charted in the following 
scatter diagram. There is a moderate negative association between the two variables, as 
we can see from the correlation coefficient r ≈ -0.66, which in this case can be considered 
satisfactory if we bear in mind the multitude of other economic factors that can influence 
these variables. The coefficient of determination is equal to R
2 ≈ 0.4, which means that 
approximately 40% of the variation in the TSVR is explained by the OCC. For a two-
tailed test, the correlation coefficient is significant on a 0.05% level, which is very high (t 
= 7.02). This result is promising in the direction of the validity of the LTRPF and invites 
for additional research in the field that would be able to offer a more comprehensive 
causal link between these variables. 
 
Figure 8. Scatter Diagram, TSVR and Organic Composition of Capital, US Nonfinancial Corporate 
Business Sector, 1946-2011 (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with Linear 
Trend
xiii
 
This result could be interpreted in reference with Mandel’s theory (1995) of technological 
long wave fluctuations in the profit rate owing to fluctuations in the OCC. It is safe to 
assume that the wider implementation of ICTs led to the replacement of living labour 
                                                 
27
 Under no circumstance does this test establish a causal relationship between the two variables, however 
strong the correlation, or the significance level of the coefficient. It constitutes nevertheless an indication 
for further inquiry. 
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with machines in the NFCB sector, which according to the LTRPF has a negative effect 
on the profit rate, when the initial gain in productivity is diffused throughout the 
economy. The universal application of ICTs and their side-products on the production 
level together with the entrance of new powers in the international competition of capital-
intensive goods (NICs) probably caused an exhaustion of the beneficial productivity 
effects that generated from the innovation capacity of the US economy. Furthermore, 
innovations that emanate conceptually in the US are nowadays usually developed and 
produced in countries with a scientifically competent workforce of lower cost through 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), where companies face a more favorable investment 
environment. That does not allow the NFCB sector of the US to successfully compete on 
an international level with these countries since long-term productive investments are 
channeled towards East Asia, leaving the US as the leader only on a research level. 
Another explanation will be presented in the following section.  
5.3. Rate of accumulation 
The rate of capital accumulation is a very important factor, especially in the nonfinancial 
corporate enterprises where the formation of new fixed capital largely determines the 
productive capacity of the sector and in turn the output growth. This rate displays the 
percent change in the growth of the net stock of private fixed assets. Another definition 
could be how much new constant capital is accumulated every year as a ratio of the 
existing stock of fixed capital. The profit rate is closely related to the rate of 
accumulation, as is obvious from the following equation: 
 
                     
   
 
 
   
   
 
   
 
 
   
   
                         (3) 
 
Large profit rates are the main motivation for further investments as well as the 
reassurance for the healthy progression of the overall economic activity of a business 
through the financing of lucrative new projects and for a stable macroeconomic 
environment (Duménil & Lévy, 1993).  
To see if there is a positive linear association between the TSVR, which is 
variable X and the accumulation rate, which is variable Y (lagged by one year), we will 
follow the same procedure as before and check the Pearson coefficient of correlation (r), 
the coefficient of determination (R
2
), and the t values of the correlation coefficient. The 
null hypothesis H0, is again that there is zero correlation between the two variables. The 
correlation of the two continuous variables is plotted in the following scatter diagram. 
The Pearson coefficient illustrates a modest positive relationship between the two 
variables of r ≈ 0.66, which is not low if we take into consideration the number and 
complexity of other economic factors that potentially affect these variables, as well as the 
cyclicality factor. The coefficient of determination is equal to R
2 ≈ 0.44, which means that 
approximately 44% of the variation in the rate of accumulation is explained by the 
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TSVR. For a two-tailed test, the correlation coefficient is significant on a 0.05% level, 
which is very high (t = 6.97). Despite the moderate positive correlation, there is 
indication that the rate of profit could affect the accumulation rate positively, but in order 
to establish a more sound causal relationship between the two variables, further 
investigation with the use of advanced econometric techniques under a strictly specified 
model is needed. Using historical costs for the fixed assets, Kliman (2009) found similar 
empirical findings, which led him to conclude that the rate of accumulation has closely 
followed the rate of profit in its decline, according to his calculations. 
  
 
Figure 9. Scatter Diagram, TSVR and Rate of Accumulation, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-
2011 (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with Linear Trend
xiv
 
In Figure 10 below, which displays the accumulation rate for the US CB sector in 
contrast with the TSVR, we can distinguish both a cyclical component and a secular trend 
in the time series with the help of the HP-filter (the results for NFCB sector time series 
are almost identical). The duration of the cycle that is apparent is 33 years from trough to 
trough and from peak to peak (1958-1991 and 1966-1999 respectively). This 
periodization is in line with the one proposed by Kondratieff and Stolper (1935) and 
Mandel (1995), where long cycles have a duration ranging from 50 to 60 years 
approximately. Aside from the fact that the capital accumulation rate collapses after 2005 
to reach a near-zero low in 2009, we can clearly see that the pace of capital accumulation 
is slowing down in the long-run and that the contracting periods are longer in duration 
than the expansionary ones. From 6.36% in the 1958 trough, the rate of accumulation fell 
to 4.26% in 1991 and to 0.05% in 2009. If we examine the peak points, we will also see 
that the accumulation rate fell rapidly from 13.28% in 1966 to 9.6% in 1999.  
This means that the long-term development of the accumulation rate cannot be 
solely explained by the movement of the profit rate, which has recovered partially or 
fully, depending on the profit flow measure, after 1982. The evolution of the 
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accumulation rate in the CB and NFCB sectors must be viewed in a long-term 
perspective with regard to socioeconomic and institutional changes that took place during 
this specific historical period and greatly affected the decision-making policies of upper 
management. This line of argumentation is not in conflict with the concept that the profit 
rate is the determinative force of the accumulation process, but rather adds to the point 
that the institutional changes that were made in order to tackle the profitability crisis of 
the 1970s, set the ground for the creation of financial bubbles that would amplify the 
effects of the Great Recession. 
 
Figure 10. TSVR and Rate of Capital Accumulation, US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011 
(Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
xv
 
According to Duménil and Lévy (2012), in the first two decades after the war it was 
common practice for business managers to dedicate a large portion of the generated profit 
to productive investment instead of distributing it through dividends to the shareholders. 
Aside from that, the authors claim that in the period of the “social contract” the financial 
system was devoted to provide constructive loans to the producing sectors in order to 
facilitate the accumulation process and the stability of economic growth. In the neoliberal 
era on the other hand, executive managers focus on achieving stock-market targets that 
will raise their personal incomes in the short-run (bonuses etc.) and are highly inclined to 
distribute a larger part of profits in the form of dividends in order to pursue that goal. 
Increasing shareholder value has become the principal aim. 
These developments are well documented in Figure 11. The share of net 
dividends in after tax profits was averaging at approximately 41% for the entire CB 
sector and at 45% for the NFCB sector from 1948 to 1981. From 1982 to 2011, this share 
averaged at approximately 61.5% for both sectors, which is roughly 20% more than in the 
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postwar period. This shift in corporate governance along with the rise in real interest rates 
that was caused by the policies implemented by the Fed after 1979 in order to tackle 
inflation, created a hostile environment for investments in the NFCB sector (Duménil & 
Lévy, 2011a, pp. 60-64).  
Nonetheless, there are counterarguments against this approach as well. While the 
increase in the share of dividends is more than apparent in the chart, the problematic 
accumulation could be ascribed to other reasons. Alternatively, the direction of the 
causation described above can be reversed, so that the rate of accumulation is declining 
not because of a change in the patterns of dividend distribution, but because corporations 
cannot “steer” their funds towards profitable investment channels. According to Michel 
Husson (2010), the self-financing of investments is the primary concern of corporations, 
after which they distribute profits that cannot be productively invested in the form of 
dividends. In this explanation, companies move their capital in search of profits towards 
the financial sector, because of a lack of effective demand in the goods-producing 
sectors, in turn due to diminishing real wages in the neoliberal era. Duménil and Lévy 
(2011b), defend their thesis by arguing that the clear upward trend that is evident in the 
share of net dividends in ATP after the mid-1970s, cannot be explained by 
disadvantageous, to the working classes, changes in income patterns that would only 
gradually affect demand. 
 
 
Figure 11. Share of Net Dividends in After Tax Profits, US Corporate Business and Nonfinancial 
Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011, Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
xvi
 
In conclusion, this debate requires further research, with more advanced econometric 
techniques, in order to obtain definite results. Differences between countries will 
probably affect the result of the outcome considerably. As far as the US case is 
concerned, we hold that the line of reasoning provided by Duménil and Lévy is 
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theoretically and empirically more robust than that of Husson, because even if one 
assumes that the real income of wage-earners (not their share in total income which fell 
indeed, but the actual wages) declined in the US after 1980, that process was largely 
counterbalanced by the vast expansion of household debt. 
 
5.4. Decomposition of the profit rate 
 
To check what influences the profit rate historically, we will decompose it into two parts 
as has been previously proposed by Duménil and Lévy (1993) and , in order to see which 
of these two components best explains the variations of the profit rate. The equation that 
generally describes our broadest profit rate measure is equation (2),      . If define Y 
as the total output of the economy or a specific sector we could rewrite equation (2) as: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 ,                                                           (2) 
 
where     is the profit share in total output and     is the output-capital ratio, 
otherwise referred to as capital productivity or maximum profit rate.
28
 The first term 
explains how much income distribution, as the outcome of balance in class power and 
relations of production (labor productivity growth vis-à-vis wage growth), affects the 
movement of the rate of profit (Mohun, 2006). The second term, explains the influence of 
the dynamic development of productive forces and technological innovation (labor 
productivity growth vis-à-vis capital intensity growth) in the variation of the profit rate 
(Mohun, 2009). Here we will only visually examine the decomposition of the profit rate 
in the CB sector. We will use the broadest profit rate measure, the TSVR. In this case, Y 
is equal to the NVA of the CB sector and K is net stock of corporate fixed assets. 
The profit share fell in the years 1950-1973 by a vast 23%, having reached its 
peak for the entire postwar period in 1949 at 33.5%. In the following years and until 2001 
the profit share stagnated on average at 27.2%. From 2001 to 2011, the profit share 
displayed an acute upward trend, increasing by 28.5%, to reach an average of 29.2% in 
the period, not far from the 30% average of the postwar years. The profit share seems to 
be the main determinant of the vast profit rate decline during the 1970s, although the 
output-capital ratio is also following the decline in the TSVR but with a lag. After 1980 
however, the profit share levels off and has a very slight ascending trend, which cannot 
explain the fluctuations in the TSVR. During this period, it seems that the output-capital 
                                                 
28
 If we assume that real wages or employee compensation were equal to zero, this would mean that the 
entire output (Y) of an economy would be profit. Thus, Y/K would be the maximum rate of net fixed capital 
return. 
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ratio has a bigger role in influencing the movements of the profit rate and has been the 
factor that drove down profitability again after 1997.  
 
Figure 12. TSVR and Profit Share (secondary axis), US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-2011 
(Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
xvii
 
Nevertheless, in order to be able to draw some sound conclusions from an analysis of the 
decomposition of the profit rate, one needs to construct an elaborate econometric model 
that would incorporate the countertendencies to the LTRPF in variables such as real wage 
growth, labour productivity growth, exploitation rate, and possibly capacity utilization. 
Such attempts have been made by Basu and Manolakos (2013), Economakis et al. (2010), 
Michl (1988), and Mohun (2006, 2009), which are mostly in line with what we have seen 
only as an indication in the visual investigation of these graphs. 
 
Figure 13. TSVR and Output-Capital Ratio (secondary axis), US Corporate Business Sector, 1946-
2011 (Current-Cost Net Stock Valuation), Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
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6. Conclusion 
While most academic scholars have focused on the unquestionable significance of the 
financial dimension of the present crisis, this paper has attempted to provide a radical 
account regarding the ultimate causes of the Great Recession, which focuses on the 
performance of capitalist production in the US, as it is exhibited by the long-term 
profitability trends in the corporate business and nonfinancial corporate business sectors.  
Every crisis manifests itself in different a way, which is specific of a certain 
historical economic conjuncture and affected by several exogenous factors. Nevertheless, 
this does not exclude the possibility to develop a theoretical framework within which one 
can explain the periodical recurrence of structural crises in the short history of capitalism. 
That framework is provided by the Marxian concept of the of tendential fall in the rate of 
profit. This approach is found on the argument that in the process of capitalist 
development there is a capital-deepening and labor-saving technical bias. Hence, there is 
a long-term tendency for the organic composition of capital to rise and for the rate of 
profit to decline. If the countertendencies that moderate the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall are exhausted, a structural crisis of profitability will emerge.  
Our findings indicate that the CB and NFCB sectors, which comprise the core of 
capitalist production in the US, have been going through a long-term period of structural 
incapacity to raise profit rates to the high levels of the pre-1970s crisis. Current-cost 
profit rate measures have increased in the period between 1980 and 1997 but their revival 
has only been partial and weak and their trend after that was either slightly descending or 
trendless. Historical-cost profit rates display a secular declining trend that flattens out 
after 2001. The only profit rate measure that has significantly recovered after 1980 is the 
ATPR, mainly due to, favorable to capital, taxation and income distribution policies. The 
CAGRs between trough-to-trough and peak-to-peak points, which are more reliable 
because they limit the effect of business cycle fluctuations, are also an indication of the 
problematic profitability performance in the US.  
The organic composition of capital in the NFCB sector suggests that the fall in the 
rate of profit after 1997 could be attributed to the wide diffusion of ICTs in production, 
which led to the saturation of the initial productivity gains, in the context of increased 
international competition in capital-intensive goods. Moreover, from an institutional 
perspective, business practices of upper management regarding investment policies and 
distribution of profits between long-term productive investments and short-term 
shareholder value shifted in favor of the latter. That process intensified the problems of 
the accumulation process in the NFCB sector that was already slowing down due to 
falling profitability and further shifted capital towards financial activities with higher risk 
and bigger profit margins, leading to consecutive asset price bubbles.  
Nevertheless, there are no permanent crises. The crisis incorporates the 
mechanism by which the economy will regain its profitability and enter a new growth 
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period. This mechanism, which has not always been allowed to act without hindrance by 
state intervention, is the vast destruction of unproductive capital. The means by which US 
policy makers and ruling classes decided to tackle the weakness of the economy in the 
1980s (wage repression, government cuts, financial expansion) created the conditions for 
further concentration and centralization of capital in a few supranational corporations that 
became too big to fail, as their network of activities extends to every corner of world and 
affects the healthy operation of many other businesses and organizations (suppliers, 
pension funds, banks etc.). The breakdown of corporations of that size, which have an 
almost institutional character in the age of neoliberalism, would potentially pull other 
productive sectors or profitable sections of the economy into a downward spiral. If one 
takes into consideration, the immense imbalances of the US economy, both on a national 
and on a global level, this development could imperil the stability of globalized free-
market capitalism as a whole, and consequently of the entire socioeconomic and political 
establishment that supports it. Hence, the means by which the system would regain its 
profitability and embark upon a new growth path would – at least in the short-term – set 
its very existence at risk. That largely explains the unwillingness of US policy makers to 
let the almighty markets decide who will survive and who will not this time. However, 
without this massive destruction of unproductive capitals, the sustainable resurgence of 
the once potent US economy as a global imperial force seems rather bleak in the 21
st
 
century. 
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Appendix A 
Descriptive Statistics 
  
Figure 14. Percent Change from Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product, US, 1946-2011, 
Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends
xix
 
 
 
Figure 15. Percent Change from Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product, US, 1947-2010, 
Quarterly Figures with HP-filtered trends
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Figure 16. Unemployment Rate and Long-term Unemployment Rate, 1948-2011, Monthly Figures 
(seasonally adjusted)
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Appendix B (Endnotes) 
                                                 
i
 “Current-cost estimates of net stocks and depreciation reflect the prices of the given period. For instance, 
the estimate of the net stock for 1997 reflects the value of the stock expressed in the prices that would have 
been paid for those assets if they had been purchased at the end of 1997. Similarly, the 1925 net stock 
estimate reflects the value of the stock in 1925 expressed at the prices that would have been paid for them if 
they had been purchased in 1925. In principle, the current-cost net stock is the market, or replacement, 
value of the stock; that is, the value for which the assets in the stock could be bought or sold in that year. In 
equilibrium, this market value will equal the present value of all expected future services embodied in 
existing assets. […] Historical-cost estimates of net stocks are analogous to book value estimates used on 
company reports and financial statements in that assets are valued at the prices prevailing when they were 
purchased. Historical cost estimates of the net stock are the depreciated values of these acquisition costs of 
assets using BEA‟s assumed depreciation patterns (BEA, 2003, pp. M-8, M-10). 
ii
 The calculation of this figure was done with data from the BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14. I divided line 12 
(taxes on corporate income) with line 11 (corporate profits with Inventory Valuation and Capital 
Consumption Adjustment). From these figures, I retrieved the average for the whole period. 
iii
 The figures on the CB sector’s share in domestic business income were calculated using data from BEA’s 
NIPA Table 1.13. I divided line 3 (corporate business income) with line 2 (domestic business income) and 
calculated the average for the period 1948-2011. For the calculation of the CB sector’s share in business 
fixed assets I used both the current-cost and the historical-cost valuation of the net stock, BEA’s FA Tables 
6.1 and 6.3 respectively. The following procedure is the same in both tables, regardless of which method is 
used to measure net fixed assets. Initially, the business fixed assets were calculated by subtracting lines 8 
(nonprofit institutions) and 9 (households) from line 1 (private fixed assets). Then, I divided that figure 
with line 2 (corporate) to obtain the share. Next, I divided line 4 (nonfinancial) with line 2 (corporate) to 
acquire the nonfinancial sector’s share in the corporate fixed assets. Finally, I used BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14 
line 19 (NVA nonfinancial corporate business) and line 3 (NVA corporate business) to calculate the NFCB 
sector’s share in the Net Value Added produced by the entire CB sector. 
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iv
 Figures calculated by me. Data on Net National Income derive from the BEA’s NIPA Table 1.7.5 line 16. 
Data on Compensation of Employees (L) and Wage and Salary Accruals (W) are from the BEA’s NIPA 
Table 1.14 lines 4 and 5 respectively. Finally, data on Total Average Weekly Earnings in private 
nonagricultural industries from 1966 to 2011 (for production or nonsupervisory workers) stem from Table 
B–47 of the 2012 Economic Report of the President. 
v
 All profit flow measures for the CB sector are from the BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14. NVA and L are lines 3 
and 4 respectively. NOS is line 8, BTP is line 11 (corporate profits with IVA and CCAdj), and ATP is line 
13 (profits after tax with IVA and CCAdj). Data on the Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets are 
from the BEA’s FA Table 6.1 line 2 (corporate). 
vi
 Data for the NFCB sector stem from the same sources as Figure 2 (see Endnote v). Profit flows from the 
BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14 lines 19 (NVA), 20 (L), 24 (NOS), 27 (BTP), 29 (ATP). Current-cost net stock of 
fixed assets from the BEA’s FA Table 6.1 line 4 (nonfinancial)., Annual Figures with HP-filtered trends 
vii
 The Compound Annual Growth Rates – CAGR were calculated using the following formula:  
     (     )
 
   , 
where Pt is the value of the profit rate at the ending year, P0 is the value of the profit rate at the starting 
year, and n is the number of years. 
viii
 Data on BTP for the CB and FCB sector are from the BEA’s NIPA Tables 6.16 A through D lines 2 and 
3 respectively.  
ix
 Same profit flows as Figure 2. Data on the Historical-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets are from the 
BEA’s FA Table 6.3 line 2 (corporate). 
x
 Same profit flows as Figure 3. Historical-cost net stock of fixed assets from the BEA’s FA Table 6.3 line 
4 (nonfinancial). 
xi
 Same procedure as in Table 2. See vii. 
xii
 To calculate the OCC for the NFCB sector, I divided the stock of fixed assets, line 4 (nonfinancial) from 
the BEA’s FA Table 6.1, with L, line 20 (nonfinancial), from the BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14. 
xiii
 Correlation coefficient (r) calculated with CORREL and PEARSON functions in Excel. The t-stat was 
calculated with the equation 6.12 from Feinstein and Thomas (2002, p. 174): 
, 
where n-2 are the degrees of freedom. To get the p-stat one can use the T.DIST.2T (for two-tailed) function 
and insert the t-stat as x. 
xiv
 Same as xiii. 
xv
 To calculate the rate of capital accumulation I divided line 6 (net private domestic investment) of the 
BEA’s NIPA Table 5.2.5 with line 2 (corporate private fixed assets) and line 4 (nonfinancial) of the BEA’s 
FA Table 6.1. 
xvi
 To calculate the share of Net Dividends in ATP for the CB and NFCB sector, I used the data from the 
BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14. I divided line 14 (corporate net dividends) with line 13 (ATP CB) and line 30 
(nonfinancial net dividends) with line 29 (ATP NFCB). 
xvii
 The profit share was calculated by dividing TSV = NVA-L by the NVA produced in the sector. Source: 
BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14 lines 3 and 4. 
xviii
 I retrieved the output-capital ratio by dividing NVA of the  CB  sector with Corporate Private Fixed 
Assets. Sources: BEA’s NIPA Table 1.14 line 3 and BEA’s FA Table 6.1 line 2. 
xix
 Source: BEA’s NIPA Table 1.7.1. Percent Change from Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic 
Product, Real Gross National Product, and Real Net National Product, Annual Figures 
xx
 Source: BEA’s NIPA Table 1.7.1. Percent Change from Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic 
Product, Real Gross National Product, and Real Net National Product, Quarterly Figures 
xxi
 Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistcs, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
Unemployment rate, Series ID: LNS14000000. 
 
